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ABSTRACT
Tom Regan argued that animal sports cannot be morally permissible 
because they are cruel and the animals do not voluntarily participate. 
While Regan is correct about actual animal sports, we should ask 
whether substantially revised animal sports could be permissible. 
We can imagine significant changes to certain animal sports, such as 
horse racing, that would avoid cruelty and even allow the animals to 
make their own choices. Where alternative options are freely avail-
able, we can consider the horses to have preference autonomy in that 
they make their own decisions, and we could thereby claim that we 
have their hypothetical consent. Though this scenario would be suf-
ficient to constitute permissible animal games, these activities could 
not amount to sports because the events would be unpredictable with 
the animals not following the rules in the precise way that sport re-
quires. Therefore, permissible animal sports are not possible.
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I. Secretariat’s Drive to Win
I thoroughly believe that Secretariat wanted to win horse 
races. I will neither argue for this claim nor insist that I can 
sufficiently support it. Nevertheless, it is one of my beliefs. 
Even while we acknowledge that most animals in sports are 
forced, often through violence, to partake, we can still accept 
that some of those animal participants may happily engage in 
the sport. Surely some horses enjoy racing on their own, and 
some may even be able to enjoy the human-organized races 
where they must compete within what must seem to them to be 
an arbitrary and restrictive system. It is at least conceivable that 
horse racing, perhaps along with other, similar animal sports, 
could both be actually cruel and be potentially enjoyable for 
some animal participants.
If I turned out to be right, what would follow? While I be-
lieve some interesting things would result, it will still not be 
enough to save animal sports. For this paper, I will use “ani-
mal” to refer to non-human animals, and “animal sports” to 
refer to any sports that purposely involve animals, such as 
hunting, bull fighting, horse and dog racing, etc. Golf is not an 
animal sport even if it has something to say about a squirrel 
moving the ball (replace the ball without penalty), because the 
squirrel’s involvement is not purposefully included. 
To judge the permissibility of animal sports, we begin with 
Tom Regan’s two main arguments against animal sports. Re-
gan’s first argument is that, as a matter of fact, all animal sports 
are cruel, and always have been (Regan 2013 [2005], 141-58). 
In some cases, the sports are necessarily cruel, such as with 
hunting (Regan 1999, 93; Regan 2013 [2005], 141-50) and with 
much of rodeo sports (Regan 2013 [2005], 150-4). Regan’s 
second argument is that animal sports both are immoral and 
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are not really true sports because sports require voluntary par-
ticipation, which the animals do not give (Regan 2013 [2005], 
142-6).
While Regan’s arguments show the impermissibility of actu-
al animal sports, more should be said about animal sports when 
taken in their best possible light. It is not difficult to imagine 
away the cruelty of some sports, but it is much more difficult 
to obtain voluntary participation. Yet, we certainly watch ani-
mals, such as our pets, voluntarily play games. We can think of 
those animals as hypothetically consenting to those games. We 
can thereby devise sports in ways that optimize the possibil-
ity of obtaining the animals’ hypothetical consent. However, 
making it possible for animals to hypothetically consent would 
require allowing them to have the genuine option to act as they 
wish. This allowance would, in turn, make the sport unpredict-
able and undermine any attempt to ensure that the competitors 
adhere to the sport’s rules. That is, the very requirements that 
would allow for the animals to voluntarily participate would 
also preclude the putative animal sports from counting as 
sports at all. 
I will thus argue that Regan is right to rule out the possibility 
of permissible animal sports. When we attempt to put animal 
sports in their best moral light, we realize that what it takes to 
make the sport morally permissible also undermines it from 
counting as a sport. Therefore, we will see that animal sports, 
as such, cannot be morally permissible. 
II. Respecting Animal Rights
We will start out by reviewing the case for animal rights, 
as provided by the work of Tom Regan. Such a beginning will 
give the context from which we can judge the moral permis-
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sibility of animal sports. If Regan is correct that animals have 
rights, then we will see that animals can only be permissibly 
used in sports if the sports both lack cruelty and allow for vol-
untary animal participation. 
Regan’s argument for animal rights begins by determining 
what kind of ontological status ought to ground rights. Should a 
being have rights because it is a human, a person, or something 
else? Regan introduces a new category, subject-of-a-life, which 
he believes is more general than humanity or personhood, but 
also more substantial than being alive or merely being con-
scious (Regan 1982, 94, 135-6; Regan 2001, 200-4; Regan 2004 
[1983], 243; Regan 2013 [2005], 50). In Empty Cages: Facing 
the Challenge of Animal Rights, Regan includes within subject-
of-a-life both an awareness of the world around you and an 
awareness of what happens to you (including your body, your 
freedom, and your life), where these senses of awareness make 
a difference to your life (Regan 2013 [2005], 50). In his earlier 
The Case for Animal Rights, Regan provides additional fea-
tures: the ability to have beliefs, desires, perceptions, memo-
ries, a sense of the future (including your own), an emotional 
life, preferences, as well as the ability to act on the preceding 
features, a sense of identity, and a sense of individual welfare 
that is tied to your identity (Regan 2004 [1983], 243).
Regan argues that subject-of-a-life provides the proper 
grounding for rights because the included features make sense 
of why a being should have rights (Regan 2001, 201-2; Regan 
2004 [1983], 243; Regan 2013 [2005], 50). Generally speaking, 
rights protect a being’s interests against unjustified encroach-
ment. For that reason, it would not make sense to impute rights 
to types of beings who are conscious or alive but who lack in-
terests. Having interests requires some sense of things going 
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well or poorly for you: if you cannot distinguish things going 
well or poorly, then you cannot distinguish your rights being 
violated from them being upheld. Subject-of-a-life references 
the type of being that sees herself as having interests, where she 
can feel that her interests can be violated or protected. Hence, it 
makes sense for subjects-of-a-life to have rights, where rights 
would not make sense for anything less than a subject-of-a-life. 
Further, Regan warns against making the grounding of 
rights more narrow than subject-of-a-life. Were we to say that 
humans hold rights because they are humans, then that would 
risk begging the question since there’s nothing peculiarly 
shared among all humans that makes them the unique holder of 
rights (Regan 1982, 82; Regan 2013 [2005], 44). Overly specif-
ic answers that seem to pick out humans alone (such as robust 
notions of rationality, the use of language, self-awareness, etc.), 
will rule out certain humans who we believe do have rights, 
such as young children (Regan 1982, 120-3; Regan 2001, 199-
201; Regan 2013 [2005], 45-7). These answers, then, do not 
work either.
Once we accept that subjects-of-a-life are the proper holders 
of rights, we quickly learn that animals have rights because 
they can have interests in the relevant ways. In Empty Cages, 
Regan argues that we can clearly tell that humans and animals 
have similar behaviors, neurological systems, and origins, 
which suggests that animals are capable of some similar inter-
ests (Regan 2013 [2005], 53-8). In The Case for Animal Rights, 
Regan argues that though animals are not moral agents, they 
are “moral patients.” Moral patients cannot be held morally ac-
countable because they cannot act from duty in the way that 
moral agency requires (Regan 2004 [1983], 152). Yet, moral 
agents can have duties to moral patients who have the requi-
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site interests and vulnerabilities that duty requires responding 
to (Regan 2004 [1983], 154-65). Since animals can be moral 
patients, they qualify as subjects-of-a-life and, therefore, can 
have rights (Regan 2004 [1983], 295-7).
For Regan, rights are universal (applying to all subjects-of-
a-life) and equal (applying to them all equally) (Regan 1999, 
92; Regan 2004 [1983], 267-8; Regan 2013 [2005], 39). Further, 
basic rights do not require the right holder to do something to 
activate the right (other rights may require activation) (Regan 
2004 [1983], 268, 273-6). One of the foremost basic rights is the 
right to be treated respectfully: having rights entails that oth-
ers have duties to respect those rights, which further requires 
respecting the being holding the rights in the first place. The 
right to be respected just follows from what it means to be a 
genuine right holder (Regan 2001, 196-7; Regan 2004 [1983], 
276-9; Regan 2013 [2005], 38-9, 42).
Since animals are subjects-of-a-life, it follows that they have 
rights, that their basic rights are equal to human rights, and 
that their rights include a right to be respected. Clearly, ani-
mal rights rule out animal sports that include cruelty. Let’s use 
“cruelty” to refer to egregiously harming animals, such as by 
killing them, risking their lives, risking their health in signifi-
cant ways, purposely causing them pain, and/or using violence 
to force them to do things they may not otherwise choose to 
do. Sports that involve killing, maiming, or purposely harming 
animals, such as hunting or bull fighting, are clearly cruel and 
one cannot possibly engage in them without disrespecting ani-
mals. Further, since sports are merely for human enjoyment, 
they offer no competing human rights to potentially excuse 
the grave disrespect that is involved in cruelty. Cruel sports 
certainly cannot be justified. Perhaps animal sports with the 
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cruelty removed could still be justified. As we will see in the 
next section, truly respecting animal rights will also require 
obtaining their hypothetical consent. 
III. Obtaining Hypothetical Consent from 
Animals
To ensure that we respect animal rights in animal sports, 
we first need to remove cruelty. Horse racing is in fact cruel. 
In a New York Times article, it was noted that 24 horses die 
per week at racetracks in the United States, which establishes 
a significant risk of death (Bogdanich et al. 2012). The same 
article pointed out that from 2009 to 2012, trainers were caught 
illegally drugging horses 3,800 times, which risks their health 
(Bogdanich et al. 2012). Further, 3,600 horses died racing or 
training in that three-year period (Bogdanich et al. 2012). These 
horrifying statistics alone establish the cruelty of the sport. The 
consistent use of whips, kicking the horses, etc., further shows 
that cruelty is a regular, unquestioned part of horse racing.
While this cruelty must be acknowledged, the philosophi-
cal issues require further examination since we can imagine a 
scenario where tough regulations with effective enforcement 
could work around the currently existing barbarity. Thus, we 
can imagine horse racing with whatever changes are necessary 
to remove every bit of cruelty: no jockey whips, no kicking 
the horses, no steroids, etc. Let’s stipulate whatever it takes to 
imagine the sport as cruelty-free so that we can ask if horse 
racing would then be morally permissible. 
The immediate worry that subsequently appears is that we 
are not respecting animals by simply not being cruel to them. 
Respect surely requires more than not being cruel. In fact, if we 
coerce animals to engage in activities that they do not enjoy or 
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would not choose themselves, we are in no fashion respecting 
them. Roughly, coercion involves the use of a threat to make 
someone, including animals, do something that they would not 
freely choose without the threat. We can imagine both cruel 
coercion, which includes threats of violence, and non-cruel co-
ercion, which would include non-violent threats such as threat-
ening a student’s grade or withholding treats from a horse. It 
is important to note that there’s a fine line between positive 
reinforcement and certain cases of non-cruel coercion. In a 
given case, one may wonder whether a treat is being withheld 
as a threat (perform or no treat) or being offered as an incen-
tive (perform and receive a treat). For now, I will put this issue 
to the side. Later, I will consider why positive reinforcement 
would not resolve the problems being discussed in this paper. 
Even when coercion is not cruel, it cannot be respectful to use 
non-violent threats to make someone do what you want, espe-
cially when they do not wish to perform the action themselves. 
Even non-cruel coercion involves making the animals per-
form some task that they otherwise would not choose for them-
selves. That is why, as noted earlier, Regan adds a second con-
dition for animal sports to be permissible: “to participate in a 
sport in its true sense requires voluntary participation on the 
part of those who compete. This is why baseball, soccer, and 
golf are sports and why (in part) the bloodbath of Christians in 
the Coliseum was not” (Regan 2013 [2005], 143). Regan adds: 
“there is no true sport where there is no volunteering” (Regan 
2013 [2005], 146). Two issues require further exploration for 
Regan’s second condition: whether Regan is right that volun-
tary participation is required to be a true sport (and not just a 
moral sport), and whether we can ever gain animals’ voluntary 
participation. 
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Regan claims that animal sports are not just immoral, but that 
they are not even true sports. For Regan, a true sport requires 
full, voluntary participation from the competitors. While it is 
clear that the murdering of Christians in the Coliseum would 
not be a sport, as Regan notes above, it would be less clear 
whether gladiator fights in the Coliseum, where the gladiators 
were slaves, would count. Surely Regan would not count them 
as true sports, but we can imagine a position that included them 
as sports, even if we think that no reasonable position would 
include them as morally permissible sports. 
Let’s next consider street racing: the illegal racing of cars 
along open city streets. While all the competitors within street 
racing volunteer to participate, the race will involve non-volun-
tary bystanders as props to be raced around. Again, this non-
voluntary bystander inclusion would surely be sufficient, for 
Regan, to exclude street racing as a true sport. Again, though, 
we can imagine a position that included street racing as a true 
but immoral sport. 
Here, I will not weigh in on Regan’s voluntariness condi-
tion for being a sport. I will simply point out that there is room 
for reasonable disagreement for more contentious cases, such 
as gladiator fights or street racing. My intuitions align with 
Regan’s: I doubt that gladiator fights, street racing, or animal 
sports are true sports. On the other hand, it is important to 
note that “sport” is surely not a normatively loaded term. Since 
there surely can be immoral sports, one has to wonder whether 
these sports with non-voluntary participants (serving either 
as competitors or props) are simply very immoral sports. I in-
tend to side-step this tricky issue by asking not whether ani-
mal sports can be true sports, but whether there can be moral 
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animal sports. I will contend that it is the attempt to make the 
sports moral that prevents them from being true sports. 
As already mentioned, to make animal sports moral, cruelty 
must be eliminated and the animals must somehow voluntarily 
participate. That takes us to the second issue: How can we de-
termine whether the animals are voluntarily participating? We 
can develop an answer based on Regan’s views on animal au-
tonomy. In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan argues that pref-
erence autonomy requires “the ability to initiate action with a 
view to satisfying [preferences]” (Regan 2004[1983], 84-85). 
One determines an animal’s autonomous choice, Regan con-
tends, in the same fashion one would for a human: you give 
them options and observe their behavior (Regan 2004[1983], 
85). Where an animal regularly chooses one option over anoth-
er regularly available alternative or over novel alternatives, the 
chosen option represents the animal’s autonomous preferences 
(Regan 2004 [1983], 85).
Hence, to see if animals voluntarily participate in sports, 
it would be necessary to give them alternatives and see if 
they choose sports over other forms of play or simply loung-
ing around. To ensure there is no non-cruel coercion, it would 
be important that the animals are not made to choose sports 
simply because that was the choice that allowed them to have 
treats. If they did regularly choose sports (without a treat to 
pressure this choice), then that would suggest that they are 
autonomously choosing the sports. While we cannot obtain 
animal consent due to the language barrier, we can consider 
animals as hypothetically consenting to any actions that they 
autonomously choose. Thus, we use autonomous choices to in-
dicate hypothetical consent. Our subsequent task is to deter-
mine whether there could be a sport that lacks cruelty and that 
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animals hypothetically consent to partake in. If such as sport 
existed, perhaps it could respect animal rights.
IV. Hypothetically Consenting to Animal Games
I began with the conjecture that some horses, such as Sec-
retariat, may enjoy racing. There is some anecdotal and fairly 
speculative evidence in favor of that idea. In a 2013 article in 
The New Atlantis (which is also critical of the cruelty in horse 
racing), Noemie Emery provides some of this speculative evi-
dence. She points out that when horses lose their riders, they 
almost always continue the race, doing their best to win (Em-
ery 2013, 72). Further, the horses tend to respond accurately to 
winning and losing, showing signs of pride and shame when 
appropriate (Emery 2013, 72). Additionally, some racehorses 
seem to become depressed when they retire (Emery 2013, 73). 
We should not too easily dismiss this evidence. Regan has 
argued that there is significant evidence that animals can form 
complex beliefs, desires, and interests (Regan 2004[1983], 
34-81). Moreover, there is abundant scientific evidence that 
animals engage in play for fun (Pellis 2002, 421-7; Balcombe 
2006, 68-9; Bekoff 2008, 53-7; Bekoff and Pierce 2010, 117), 
and that their play is complex in various ways, including a 
certain amount of rule following (Pellis 2002, 423; Balcombe 
2006, 70-1; Bekoff 2008, 87-100; Bekoff and Pierce 2010, 120-
5; de Waal 2013, 230-1). It is plausible that animals could au-
tonomously choose to participate in certain sports and we can 
certainly imagine animals enjoying a race.
At the same time, we ought to be wary of our biases that make 
us wish to believe that animals are enjoying the very activities 
that we humans are making them perform. Jason Wyckoff calls 
this kind of bias a form of “dominionism,” which involves the 
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creation of a knowledge system that implicitly takes animals 
to be objects rather than subjects (Wyckoff 2015). Though ani-
mals can have complex interests, we must be careful, accord-
ing to Wyckoff, when attributing interests to animals since we 
cannot speak to them. In particular, we are prone to imputing 
false animal interests that instead fit our human interests. Hu-
mans who support horse racing (and pretty much everyone that 
Emery references surely does) are more likely to see horses as 
enjoying the races. Accordingly, we have to be careful when 
drawing conclusions from these interpretations. 
Similar to Regan’s view on animal autonomy, Wyckoff urg-
es us to allow the animals to speak for themselves through their 
“nonlinguistic expressions of preference” (2015, 127). Follow-
ing Regan and Wyckoff, we can tone down any conclusions 
we draw from Emery’s evidence. We cannot be certain that 
horses enjoy racing, but we can conclude that it is possible that 
they could. Even if it turned out that no horses actually en-
joy current conditions, we can certainly imagine horses who 
would enjoy cruelty-free racing. That possibility will serve as 
our starting point. 
Given the possibility that horses may enjoy racing, we can 
devise a method to determine which ones wish to race at a giv-
en time. We would then stipulate whatever conditions it takes 
to provide the horses genuine alternatives both to going to the 
start line and to competing once there. The latter is practical-
ly simple: with no whips, no kicking, and no violence of any 
kind allowed, it will be quite difficult to make the horses race 
against their will (positive reinforcement offers a complicated 
alternative to violence, which, as mentioned, we will discuss 
later). The horses can choose not to start, not to run fast, or to 
do something other than what the race requires. One can fig-
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ure out if the horse wishes to go to the starting line by giving 
multiple alternative options. The horse should never be forced 
out of their stall or into the starting gate, and they should have 
the freedom to lay around, play somewhere else, or even run 
on their own. Once the horses have multiple options, only the 
horses that wish to race will both show up at the starting line 
and engage in the actual race.
With these parameters, we can obtain the horses’ hypotheti-
cal consent. In the scenario devised here – the best case for a 
morally permissible animal sport – we have arranged the activ-
ity so that there is no cruelty and the horses participate volun-
tarily. To avoid begging any questions, let’s say that we have 
preliminarily established that we can gain horses’ hypothetical 
consent to animal games. We have yet to establish that this 
activity counts as a sport. As noted, Regan doubted that it was 
possible for there to be true animal sports. While we are not 
pursuing that general issue, we can now ask whether there can 
be morally permissible animal sports. 
V. Against the Possibility of Permissible Animal 
Sports
It is doubtful that permissible animal games could count as 
animal sports. To explain why, it will be necessary to figure 
out what constitutes a sport. It is notoriously difficult to de-
fine “sport” in part because so many distinct practices count as 
sports (McBride 1975; Morgan 1977; Wertz 1995; McFee 2004, 
15-32). Some sports involve teams, balls, and physical contact, 
while other sports involve individuals performing gracefully 
on complex apparatuses. It is likely impossible to find neces-
sary and sufficient conditions that can be met by all and only 
sports. 
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Even without an incontestable definition of sport, we can 
find certain traits that generally pick out what count as sports 
(Morgan 1977; Wertz 1995). We are then seeking out neither 
a definition nor necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather 
traits that are typically associated with sports. For this pur-
pose, we can use attempts to define sport without regard for 
the original philosopher’s intention to choose traits that they 
saw as leading to a definition. We will slightly repurpose their 
allegedly defining traits to instead develop traits that typically 
pick out sports (following the methodology of Morgan 1977; 
Wertz 1995; McFee 2004, 27).
Bernard Suits attempts to define sports, which he sees as 
essentially games. To this end, Suits starts with characteris-
tics for games that he believes are also required for sports: (a) 
there should be a goal, (b) a set means for achieving the goal, 
(c) rules, and (d) a lusory attitude (Suits 1988 [1973], 39-43). 
A person has a lusory attitude if she accepts and follows the 
rules for no reason other than that they are the rules. A person 
with a lusory attitude does not seek out extrinsic motivation 
for following the rules. In moving from games to sports, Suits 
adds (e) the game should involve skill, (f) the skill should be 
physical, (g) the game should have a wide following, and (h) 
its following should achieve a certain amount of stability (Suits 
1988 [1973], 43-45). David Fairchild is similarly attempting to 
define sports when he incorporates Suits’ traits and then adds 
a few more: (i) there are professional versions, (j) it develops a 
tradition, and (k) chance is not a major factor in winning (Fair-
child 1978, 229).
Since we will not use these eleven traits as necessary and 
sufficient conditions, we need not quibble over whether each 
one does its job of picking out sports well. It is instead useful 
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here to note which characteristics assist with judging permis-
sible animal sports. For that reason, let’s set aside (g), (h), (i) 
and (j). Each of these traits applies to most animal sports as 
they currently exist: they have professional versions with wide 
followings and established traditions, which ensures stability 
(even if that stability is regretful given their cruelty). Further, 
these points cannot be assessed for our imagined, putatively 
permissible animal sports since we cannot know in advance 
how audiences would react to such sports. 
That leaves us with traits (a) – (f) and (k). My concern, 
which I will develop through examining these remaining seven 
traits, is that the act of requiring voluntary animal participation 
prevents the resulting animal games from counting as sports. 
Though many of these traits can be found in permissible ani-
mal games, the voluntariness undermines the possibility that 
the animals will predictably behave in the ways that sport re-
quires. 
Let’s begin with the traits requiring physical skill, (e) and 
(f). These requirements are easily met insofar as animal sports, 
in pretty much all versions, require that the animals have cer-
tain physical skills; the animals are never being directly tested 
for their mental abilities, but are tested with respect to speed, 
strength, agility, and control. 
Next, consider the traits that require (a) goals and (b) means 
for achieving them. We can certainly devise animal games so 
that there are concrete goals and means for achieving them. A 
race is a straightforward example. The goal is to cross the fin-
ish line first, and the means is running the race. It is less clear 
whether meeting (a) and (b) requires knowingly doing so. In 
typical sports, the competitors certainly know their goals and 
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purposefully act toward them. Yet, we cannot beg the question 
against cruel animal sports. Many people would accept that not 
all of the horses have the same conception of the goal as the 
jockey. This point though would not make most people deny 
that horse racing is a sport. We once again face a reasonable 
understanding of (immoral) sports where (a) and (b) can be met 
without the competitors thinking of the goal and the means 
in the appropriate way. For our purposes, we can cautiously 
concede that horse races can act in accord with these two traits. 
The sticking points will be (c) rules, (d) a lusory attitude, 
and (k) luck not determining victory. Animals are unlikely 
to adopt a lusory attitude since we cannot expect them to see 
our rules as regulating their behaviors just because they are 
the rules we have set. Rules in general are more complex than 
goals or the means for achieving the goals. While we can imag-
ine horses who wish to win a race, it is much harder to imagine 
that they could knowingly adopt our rules that limit their ac-
tions in particular ways. One reason that cruelty is prevalent in 
animal sports is that cruelty ensures that the activities proceed 
in accordance with the rules. Jockeys whip or kick their horses 
if the horses do something that is deemed aberrant according 
to the rules. Training can similarly be roughly applied to teach 
the animals to follow human rules. Without violence, it is much 
harder to convey the rules to the animals. Positive reinforce-
ment can definitely assist here, though it will create other is-
sues that we will discuss shortly. 
Since rules are complex and not easily conveyed without 
language, we will struggle to ensure that animals follow rules, 
and it is especially unlikely that the animals will do so with a 
lusory attitude. This point does not require the view that ani-
mals cannot understand rules. As noted earlier, there is sig-
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nificant scientific evidence that animals engage in games that 
do seem to involve rule following (Pellis 2002, 423; Balcombe 
2006, 70-71; Bekoff 2008, 87-100; Bekoff and Pierce 2010, 120-
5; de Waal 2013, 230-1). The point here is simply that we can-
not ensure that animals will follow the rules since we cannot 
convey our rules precisely to them.
In response to these worries, we can imagine the animals as 
props. This position ought to be considered with caution due 
to Wyckoff’s worries about dominionism. It is worrisome to 
treat the animals as props, and doing so risks that we are be-
ing biased when we think that they voluntarily agree to act as 
props. This competitor/prop distinction, however, can be more 
philosophical than practical. We can envision the rider as fol-
lowing the rules with a lusory attitude, for the purpose of say-
ing that the condition for being a “sport” is met, while the horse 
is simply attempting to meet the goal. In this way, it need not be 
worrisome to consider the animal to be a fully voluntary prop. 
The human competitors both understand the rules and act with 
a lusory attitude. The humans then attempt to use the animals 
in ways that are in accordance with the rules. Provided that 
animals could voluntarily participate as props, this response 
could give some room for meeting traits (c) rules and (d) a lu-
sory attitude.
Whether as competitors or key props, we will not be able to 
ensure that the animals will voluntarily engage in the sports in 
the ways that we humans have deemed appropriate. We can de-
vise goals that the animals can meet, means for the animals to 
meet those goals, and rules that work around the animals (such 
as with human competitors following the rules). Yet, none of 
this fine-tuning of the activities will entail that the animals will 
choose to engage in the sport in the way in which we have 
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devised, especially without any use of force or violence. The 
animals are free to act within their own understandings of the 
activities, including choosing to not engage in the alleged sport 
at all. Even where the animals are props, they can choose to 
act differently than the human competitor wishes. Thus, even 
while the human competitor is following the rules, it does not 
entail that the animal will act accordingly. Given the animals’ 
freedom, the outcome of the sport ends up being entirely ran-
dom from our perspective; in other words, winning depends 
on luck.
Moral animal games would fail to have trait (k) in that the 
outcome would indeed be based mostly on luck. Since we can-
not know in advance which animals will participate, which 
animals will try their hardest to win, and which animals will 
follow the rules as we have devised them, we cannot know 
which animal will win. Whether the animals are competitors 
or props, their unpredictable behavior reduces the sporting ac-
tivity to a matter of chance.
Perhaps using positive reinforcement to predictably direct 
the animals’ behavior can avoid the dependence on luck with-
out using cruelty or coercion. Positive reinforcement can be 
used to train the animals, to make them act in accord with the 
rules, and to make the outcome based more on manageable and 
predictable sport performances. Positive reinforcement may 
seem to make animal sports morally permissible. 
The problem is that selective positive reinforcement, where 
treats are given only for certain behaviors, will amount to the 
non-cruel coercion of the animals, especially given the lan-
guage barrier. To obtain the animals’ hypothetical consent, we 
urged that animals be given meaningful alternatives. If trainers 
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only reward animals if the animals make the choices that the 
sport requires, then the promise of a treat becomes a threat in 
itself – namely the threat of not receiving a treat due to choos-
ing alternative options. Among humans, the fine line between 
genuine positive reinforcement and non-cruel coercion can be 
navigated through verbal explanation. We can explain to some-
one why we are using positive reinforcement (we want them to 
see the value of making the choice, for example), we can ask 
them whether the choice was worth it after they have made it, 
and we can determine if the person would now autonomously 
make the choice themselves by asking them. On the other hand, 
selective positive reinforcement counts as non-cruel coercion 
of animals because it prevents us from determining the pref-
erence autonomy of the animals. The animals are choosing 
based on the treat as opposed to based on their own wishes. 
We cannot explain to them that we are using the treat to help 
them value the choice in itself, and we also cannot ask them 
to explain to us if they are later choosing to act autonomously 
or because they simply fear losing out on the treat. Selective 
positive reinforcement for animals undermines the voluntary 
participation requirement and amounts to non-cruel coercion 
because, as far as we can determine, the animal is only choos-
ing out of fear of missing out. If positive reinforcement is not 
selective (the animal receives treats no matter what they do), 
then it will no longer motivate the animal to specifically act as 
the sport requires. Therefore, using positive reinforcement is 
not sufficient for animal sports to be permissible since selective 
positive reinforcement prevents us from determining animal 
autonomy, which is necessary to meet the condition that the 
animals voluntarily participate. 
As another potential worry, perhaps we should not refer 
to this unpredictability as luck since the animals are indeed 
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making choices. Luck does not determine which animal wins 
as much as the animals’ own choices do. The problem is that 
sports involve organized activities where being best at the ac-
tivity is meant to largely determine the outcome. It is fairly 
characteristic of sport that the participants are trying to win. 
Where some are choosing not to compete or choosing to follow 
their own rules, and where we cannot predict these choices, it is 
not clear that we have something recognizable as sport. There 
is sufficient difference between a sport and an unpredictable 
activity where it is unclear who will actually compete accord-
ing to the rules that it is simply not possible to call the latter 
a sport, even without having a formal definition of sport. It is 
unimportant whether we refer to this unpredictability as being 
based in luck – it is the fact of the unpredictability that under-
mines the activity from counting as a sport.
Even with just one trait definitely lacking, I believe there is 
good reason to exclude voluntary, cruelty-free animal games 
from being sports. These games will consist of animals, wheth-
er as competitors or props, doing as they please in the manners 
in which they please. While some of them may choose to en-
gage appropriately in the alleged sport, their doing so will be 
entirely unpredictable. The activity will be unruly in a way that 
is characteristic of children or animals playing for fun, but not 
of organized sport. Thus, in making the animal games morally 
permissible, we end up undermining them from being sports. 
Permissibility derives from removing cruelty and allowing 
freedom for the animals. Yet, these moves prevent us from be-
ing able to control the animals in a way that would allow the 
activity to be a sport. Thus, there can be permissible animal 
games, but there cannot be permissible animal sports. If there 
can be animal sports at all (which we have not fully weighed on 
here), they will not be morally permissible. 
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VI. Letting the Horses Play
We began by wondering whether animal sports could be 
made morally permissible. Following Tom Regan’s arguments, 
we acknowledged that actual animal sports are in fact cruel 
and far from morally permissible. Pointing out the actual cruel-
ty is immensely important. It leaves open, though, the question 
of whether animal sports could be made morally permissible. 
We can seemingly devise animal sports that lack cruelty. 
As we noted, Regan raised an additional concern for animal 
sports: the animals should be able to voluntarily participate or 
refuse to do so. With theories of preference autonomy and hy-
pothetical consent devised to apply to animals, we could de-
velop animal games where the animals had sufficient alterna-
tives such that it made sense to consider their participation to 
be voluntary. In such cases, the games would be both cruelty 
free and have voluntarily participation from the animals. We 
can say that these animal games would be morally permissible. 
While these games could be morally permissible, that does 
not establish that there can be permissible animal sports. We 
would be considering a game where the animals choose to act 
as they please. While some may act in ways that are largely 
consistent with the intentions of the people organizing the al-
leged sport, it will be entirely unpredictable which ones will 
refuse to act and which ones may act in inconsistent ways. A 
horse may choose to race appropriately five times in a row and 
then choose to sit out or run the wrong way in the next race. 
Voluntary participation, without force, violence, coercion, and 
any way to directly communicate, will lead to a good bit of ran-
domness, which contrasts with the organized nature of sports. 
Animal games could be fun for the animals, fun for the audi-
ence, and sometimes involve animals competing to achieve a 
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goal. Yet, our rumination on morally permissible animal games 
leads us to conclude, in agreement with Regan, that morally 
permissible animal sports are impossible. 
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